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FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION FOR INTERNATIONAL
RIVERS: WHAT DOES IT MEAN?

Ralph W. Johnson*
s the principle of free navigation, as applied to international
rivers, relevant to present-day political and economic reality?
Ordinarily, the first thing to be done in an article such as this
is to define the principal term, i.e., "free navigation," or "navigational freedom." In this case it is impossible to give a single definition. The term, idea, concept, or rationale is a chameleon, changing
its meaning from place to place and from time to time. A number
of the following pages will be devoted to tracing these various
meanings and showing the confusion that arises from their existence. Briefly, there are at least five major meanings that must be
dealt with: (1) physical freedom of movement of vessels up and
down a river, without regard to trading opportunities or access to
port facilities; (2) physical freedom, plus complete laissez faire
opportunity for trading among riparian countries; (3) physical
freedom, plus the realistically limited trading opportunities of
nineteenth century Europe; (4) physical freedom, plus the realistically limited trading opportunities of present-day western Europe; (5) physical freedom, plus the realistically limited trading
opportunities of present-day eastern Europe. There is also confusion between the idea of navigational freedom on the one hand
and the international commissions sometimes created to assure such freedom on the other. There are other meanings and
submeanings to these terms, but those noted above are the most
commonly encountered. No one, it seems, has ever successfully
settled the definition, although the author has concluded that the
most commonly intended meaning is number (2) above. In most
instances authors simply fail to indicate which of the various
meanings they intend. Unless otherwise indicated, the number
(2) definition above will be used in this article.
Among many writers on the subject, such as Westlake, Hall,
Eagleton, Ogilvie, Kaeckenbeeck, Chamberlain, Smith, DeVisscher, and Schwarzenberger, there has been not only a lack of
agreement as to the meaning of the concept, but also wide disagreement as to how well "it" (by whatever definition) has been accepted, or should be accepted, by the nations that control the inter-
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national rivers of the world. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that
the concept has formed the verbal, if not real, cornerstone of
numerous treaties and conferences on international rivers, from
the Vienna Conference of 1815 to the Belgrade Conference of
1948. At present, it is apparently about to be reconfirmed as the
lodestar for the drafting of international river agreements, this
time by the International Law Association. 1
The purpose of this paper will be to analyze the origin of the
concept, trace its (their) development, point out the most commonly used meanings, and then demonstrate the substantial
irrelevance of the concept, by any of these definitions, to presentday river navigation and trade problems.
Europe's acceptance of the principle of free navigation for
international rivers, manifested by the Act of the Congress of
Vienna, 1815,2 the Mayence Convention, 1831, the Mannheim
Convention, 1868, the Treaty of Paris, 1856, the Berlin Treaty,
1885, the Belgrade Convention, 1948, and others, is unique, and
has not been repeated in other parts of the world. In South
America, during the latter part of the nineteenth century, navigation on the Amazon, Orinoco, Rio de la Plata, and some other
rivers was made available to international use by legislation, executive proclamation, or bilateral treaty. In North America, on
the St. Lawrence, the United States was guaranteed navigational
rights by the Treaty of Washington of 1871, but no "regime" of
"navigational freedom" has ever been established.8 The tendency
1 This question is currently under consideration by the International Law Associa•
tion. At its September 1961 meeting, the Committee on the Uses of the Waters of Inter•
national Rivers of the International Law Association adopted Draft Articles Concerning
Navigation which affirm and carry forward the provisions of the Barcelona Convention
of 1921 concerning navigable freedom, albeit in slightly different terminology and with
a few minor changes. In the comment accompanying the draft articles the committee
reviewed the various treaties and conventions concerning navigation on international
rivers (nearly all of which are before 1921) and commented at 42: "A movement for
the recognition of free navigation on international rivers set in at the end of the
eighteenth century and was developed in the 19th century. It would be a good thing if
this development would continue at present." The draft contains no significant analysis
of how the principle of navigational freedom is supposed to fit into the very different
political-economic setting of today. In this connection, cf. DE V1sscHER, THEORY AND
REALITY IN PUBUC INTERNATIONAL LAW 207 (1957); l HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 565 (2d
rev. ed. 1945).
2 In the Act of the Congress of Vienna of 1815 (Article 15) the concept of navigable
freedom for international rivers was called "part of the public law of Europe," During
the nineteenth century some eminent legal writers spoke of a "legal right" of free
navigation. See WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 142-59 (1904).
8 See Lawford, Treaties and Rights of Transit on the St. Lawrence, 1961 CAN. B. REv.
577.
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in the Americas has been not to enunciate navigational freedom
as the guiding principle of law, but rather to regard the right to
use a river as a privilege to be granted or denied at the will of the
territorial sovereign.4 Also, no successful effort has ever been made
to establish the European type of international commission to
administer international rivers in the Americas. Similarly, the
principle of navigational freedom has not been accepted by the
Asians as the guiding principle for international river control. 5
In Europe the acceptance of the navigational freedom principle reached a high point immediately after the First World War,
as illustrated by the post-war treaties, the writings of the time,6
and the convention approved at the 1921 Barcelona Conference.
The post-war treaties declared freedom of navigation for the
Rhine, upper and lower Danube, Elbe, and Oder. The European
Danube Commission and the Central Commission of the Rhine
were confirmed and new international commissions, with nonriparian representation, were created for the fluvial Danube, the
Elbe, and the Oder. A general conference on the question of legal
regimes for international rivers was called for the near future, and
was held in 1921 at Barcelona. The conference delved into the
various methods of controlling navigation on international rivers,
finally adopting a convention incorporating the navigational freedom principle in much the same terms as used in prior treaties
and conventions concerning Europe's rivers. Some effort was exerted to make the basic convention extend the principle of navigational freedom to internal rivers, but this effort failed. Instead, an
additional protocol was prepared, permitting states to apply the
principle to their internal rivers if they so desired. In the years
following the Barcelona Conference hopes for widespread ratification, or at least acceptance, of the Barcelona principles gradually
died. At present, of those states that are riparian to navigable
international rivers, seven have ratified: Austria, France, BuJgaria,
See 1 HYDE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 524-34.
Those who have made a special study of this matter do not report treaties, conventions, or other sources from Asia which attempt to apply the navigational freedom
concept. See, e.g., id. at 524-65; the Report of the Committee on the Uses of the Waters
of International Rivers of the International Law Association, which was tentatively
approved at the Brussels Conference (1962); FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAw 288-310 (1934);
1 WHEATON, INTERNATIONAL LAW 384-404 (6th ed. 1929); India's "denunciation" of the
Barcelona Convention, effective March 26, 1957, 230 U.N.T .S. 448.
6 See, e.g., EAGLETON, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT 243-44 (1932); KAECKENBEECK,
INTERNATIONAL RlvERs § 275 (1918); OGILVIE, INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS 168 (1920). Some
writers took a more moderate view. See 1 WHEATON, op. cit. supra note 5, at 385.
4
Ii
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Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and India. An additional
thirteen nonriparians ratified. 7 At present, of the riparians, only
France would seem to be still adhering to the Convention. Four
of the original riparians-Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Rumania-are members of the 1948 Danube regime which, although articulating some of the navigational freedom words, actually operates under a different set of principles. 8 In 1960 Austria
also joined this regime. 9 In 1956 India filed with the United
Nations a "denunciation" of the Barcelona Convention, effective
March 26, 1957.10 In summary, it may be said that the present
trend among states is away from the general convention or universal solution approach to navigational control problems and
toward solution by specific limited agreements.11 This trend is
further illustrated by the marked decline in the fortunes of the
international commissions established in Europe to assure navigational freedom, which, presumably, were to serve as the examples
for similar organizations throughout the world.
Since the early 1930's there has been a steady crumbling of
those European regimes which purport to assure international
freedom of navigation. The 1856-1919 regime for the Danube was
modified virtually out of existence by the 1936 Sinaia agreement,
signed by Great Britain, France, and Rumania, and approved by
Italy, which transferred most of the powers of the European Danube Commission to Rumania. The river thus became subject to
Rumanian municipal law. 12 In 1948 the Soviet-dominated Belgrade
Conference established an entirely new Danube regime, under
the control of the Communist riparians and thus subject to extensive planning and government control rather than to a "navigational freedom" policy.13 The 1919 regime for the Oder was suspended with the German invasion of Poland in 1940. Since the
7 Albania, the British Empire, New Zealand, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy,
Luxemburg, Norway, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey. LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., 20th &:
21st Ass., Spec. Supp. No. 192-195, at 89 (1939-46).
8 See Johnson, The Danube Since 1948, 1963 YB. OF WoRLD AFFAIRS 236; Cattell,
The Politics of the Danube Commission Under Soviet Control, 19 AM. SLAVIC AND E. EUROPEAN REv. 380 (1960); Gorove, Internationalization of the Danube: A Lesson in History,
8 J. PUB. L. 125 (1959).
9 Austria's joinder was completed in January 1960. BuNDESGESETZBLATI FUR DIE
R.El'UBLIK OSTERREICH Nr. 40 (1960).
10 Effective March 26, 1957. 230 U.N.T.S. 448.
11 See DE V1sscHER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 207.
12 For comment on the Sinaia agreement, see Sinclair, The Danube Conference of
1948, 1948 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 398-404 (1948); Gorove, supra note 8, at 125-54.
13 See Johnson, supra note 8, at 236.
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Second World War the river has been in Communist territory,
and the 1921 regime has not been reconstituted. The 1919 Elbe
regime similarly went into eclipse in the late 1930's with the rise
of the Third Reich. The river is now cut in two by the EastGerman, West-German zonal border, and no navigation of any
kind passes that line. Although the portion of the Elbe in West
Germany is navigated extensively, it is under the control of the
West German Federal Republic. The last of the great international
river commissions to remain in effect is on the Rhine, where the
famous Central Commission still operates. But the hopes of some
of the creators of this regime that it should gradually be expanded
to include the Moselle, and the Rhine above Basle,14 have not
materialized. 15 Further, the navigational freedom provisions of
the Rhine conventions have been gradually altered and eroded by
activities in other fields, such as pooling agreements allocating
cargoes among ship companies, national economic planning by
riparians and, more recently, the supra-national economic planning and regulation of the European Communities.
To what can we ascribe these severe changes in Europe's international river regimes? It is apparent that an examination of the
basic legal documents will not reveal a complete explanation,
because in many instances these documents still speak with the
voice of the nineteenth century. 16 We must instead turn to relevant
economic and political data for the answers.
H See CHAMBERLAIN, THE REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL RIVERS: DANUBE AND RHINE
277•78 (1923).
15 The Moselle is now subject to the special jurisdiction of a new international corporation, by virtue of a Franco-German agreement of 1956. See JESSUP & TAUBENFELD,
CONTROLS FOR OUTER SPACE 129 (1959). The Rhine above Basie is still controlled by the
riparians.
16 It is somewhat surprising to observe that the freedom of navigation concept appears in essentially the same form in the Treaty of Vienna in 1815, the Mayence Convention on the Rhine in 1831, the Treaty of Paris on the Danube in 1856, the Mannheim
Convention on the Rhine in 1868, the Berlin Treaty on the Congo and Niger Rivers in
1878, the Versailles and other treaties on the Rhine, Danube, Elbe, and Oder in 1919,
the Barcelona Convention in 1921, even the Belgrade Convention on the Danube in
1948, and now the 1962 draft articles of the I.L.A. Committee on International Rivers.
The most important early statement of this principle appeared in the Treaty of Vienna
in 1815. The Treaty there adopted said:
"The navigation of • . . [Europe's international] . • . rivers, along their whole
course, ••. from the point where each of them becomes navigable, to its mouth,
shall be entirely free, and shall not, in respect to commerce, be prohibited to any
one; it being, however understood, that the regulations established with regard to
the policing of this navigation shall be respected; as they shall be framed alike for all,
and as favourable as possible to the commerce of all nations." Treaty of Vienna,
June 9, 1815, articles concerning Navigation on the Rhine, Art. I. l HERTSLET,
COMMERCIAL TREATIES 19 (1840).
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Politics and Economics
"Navigation, in and for itself, is worthwhile only to a few
yachtsmen; it is because they can carry cargoes and passengers
that ships are sailed. The right, therefore, to navigate a river
is of value only if the riparian state or states permit ships to
trade at their ports so that freedom of navigation of a river
implies freedom to take part in commerce at the river
ports." 17
If a political approach is taken, one can argue that the changes
In 1831 the Mayence Convention for the Rhine set out a similar provision which
was then carried forward into the 1868 Mannheim Convention:
"La Navigation dans tout le cours du Rhin, du point ou iI devient navigable jusqu'a
la mer, soit en descendant, soit en remontant, sera entierement libre, et ne pourra,
sous le rapport du Commerce, etre interdite a personne, en se conformant toutefois aux
reglements de police, exiges pour le maintien de la surete generale, et aux dispositions
arretees par le present Reglement.
"Sa Majeste le Roi des Pays-Bas consent a ce que le Leck et l'embranchement dit le
·waal, soient tous les deux consideres comme la continuation du Rhin dans le
Royaume des Pays-Bas." Mayence Convention, March 31, 1831, Art. I. 18 BRITISH AND
FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1077-1078 (1833).
This convention also created the famous Central Commission of the Rhine to carry
out the purposes of the Treaty. This Treaty and the Central Commission still control
navigation on the Rhine today.
In 1856 the Treaty of Paris established the famous European Danube Commission and
provided for free navigation on the Danube. This theme was confirmed in the World
War I Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Sept. IO, 1919, which provided:
Art. 291. "The following river is declared international: The Danube from Ulm;
together with all navigable parts of this river system which naturally provide more
than one State with access to the sea, with or without transhipment from one vessel
to another. . . ."
Art. 292. "On the waterways declared to be international in the preceding Article,
the nationals, property and flags of all Powers shall be treated on a footing, •.• of
perfect equality, no distinction being made, to the detriment of the nationals, property or flag of any Power, between them and the nationals, property or flag of the
riparian State itself or of the most favoured nation." 29 HERTSLET, COMMERCIAL
TREATIES 436-37 (1923).
The control of the lower Danube was effectively handed over to Rumania by the Sinaia
agreement of 1936 between Rumania, Great Britain, and France; however, no change was
made in the navigational freedom formula by the new decision-makers. Even the Sovietcontrolled Belgrade Convention of 1948 continued essentially the same verbal form:
"Navigation on the Danube shall be free and open for the nationals, vessels of commerce and goods of all states, on a footing of equality in regard to port and navigation charges and conditions of merchant shipping. The foregoing shall not apply to
traffic between ports of the same state." 33 U.N.T.S. 197-222 (1949), Art. I.
In 1885 the Berlin treaty concerning the Congo and Niger Rivers provided:
"The navigation of the Congo, without excepting any of its branches or outlets, is,
and shall remain, free for the merchant-ships of all nations equally, whether carrying
cargo or ballast, for the transport of goods or passengers. It shall be regulated by the
provisions of this Act of Navigation, and by the rules to be made in pursuance
thereof.
"In the exercise of this navigation the subjects and flags of all nations shall in all
respects be treated on a footing of perfect equality •.••" Art. XIII, Treaty of Berlin,
Feb. 26, 1885. 17 HERTSLET, COMMERCIAL TREATIES 68 (1890).
This treaty provided for the creation of an international commission to administer
navigation on these African rivers, but the Commission was never formed.
17

CHAMBERLAIN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 282.
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in Europe's international river regimes have resulted from political and military power shifts over the past thirty or forty years.
The 1856 Danube regime was a product of British power in the
Black Sea area after the Crimean War and of the British desire to
nourish her considerable commercial interests there; the 1885
Congo regime was a product of European dominance in Africa
during the late 1800's and of a fairly evenly balanced, mutual
desire by the Europeans to exploit the Congo's resources peacefully; the post-World War I regimes for the Danube, Rhine, Elbe,
and Oder were the products of the Allied victory in the First
World War and of the desire by the victors to subject the fallen
Germany to as much international, non-German control as possible. The allies also sought to assure their commercial shipping
access to east European markets. But this part of the picture does
not explain the absence of new regimes guaranteeing navigational
freedom on the same and other rivers, reflecting a more current
power picture. Nor does it explain why "navigational freedom"
is becoming less relevant to the reality of traffic and regulations on
the Rhine in recent years. An examination of relevant economic
factors sheds more light on the problem.
Grotius argued that navigational freedom on the high seas
sprang from a rationally based natural law. 18 It now seems apparent
that the basis of the principle as applied to international rivers lies
in the capitalistic, laissez faire economic system which began to
replace European mercantilism in the eighteenth century and,
with the help of Adam Smith, Bentham, Locke, and others,
attained widespread acceptance in the nineteenth century. In
connection with international trade this sytem held that the greater
the freedom, the greater the over-all economic progress. This in
turn supported the principle of navigational freedom for international rivers.
Not only did the laissez faire, free trade system of the nineteenth
century give rise to the navigational freedom concept, it also
provided the economic setting within which that concept v\'.'as
meaningful, i.e., a situation in which shipowners could obtain
cargoes by making their price and quality of service competitive,
and could stay in business by earning profits from their efforts.
They could freely contact different individuals or companies to
induce cargoes onto their vessels. Presumably their continuation
18 GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS

(1625).
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in business resulted more from their greater efficiency vis-a-vis
their competitors, than from governmental subsidies, favoritism
in state regulation, or monopolistic agreements with manufacturers and purchasers.
It may be readily admitted that even in the nineteenth century
heyday of the laissez faire, free trade system it could not be said
that all purchases, sales and carriage agreements were solely the
product of "market" factors. The influence of the state, in the
form of protective tariffs, import quotas, exchange controls, subsidies and the like, intervened to influence the market. However,
there is little doubt that market factors played a greater part than
they do today. Europe, with much of the rest of the world, has
now passed into the era of the "planned" economy.
Business and informed public opinion both now accept the
notion that national governments ought to participate in the
planning of key aspects of economic life. In the past fifteen years
there has been a remarkable acceptance in Europe of the notion
that supranational "governments," such as the European Economic
Community and the Coal and Steel Community should engage in
such planning activity. This new function of government, at all
levels, is especially manifest in the transport industry, and its existence there as elsewhere changes significantly the setting in which
navigation occurs on international rivers. It necessarily also
changes the meaning of the term "navigational freedom." This
change was aptly put by the District Court of the Hague in the
1952 Restraint at Lobith case.
"[T]he Court must make the preliminary remark that reference to a principle laid down in the Convention of Mannheim,
which was approved by a Netherlands Act of Parliament,
was a reference to a Treaty and a law dating from the year
1868 and 1869, that is, from a period when regulations ordering the economic life of a country, such as have become an
urgent necessity in present circumstances, were, if not entirely unknown, at least considered of so little importance that
no attention was paid to them: certainly no account was taken
of them when the principles of the Convention of Mannheim
were formulated. In the course of years, however, economic
conditions in the world have undergone changes of so important a nature-even leaving aside reasons of a political nature
-that it has become essential for the Government, with a
view to serving the general, not to say national, interest, to
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make all kinds of regulations applicable to the Rhine, without
any direct bearing on free navigation on that river. The economic life of a country and the regulations enacted on its
behalf have nowadays become respectively so wide in scope,
and so sweeping, that provisions intended to operate in a
particular field are necessarily bound to produce, or may
easily produce, effects elsewhere which may prove to be inconvenient and troublesome for persons not directly interested. It does not follow, however, that such regulations must
be regarded as unlawful so that in case of damage a claim for
compensation arises. Suppose, to quote an example, that the
fixing of very high coal prices in the Netherlands, necessitated
by a stress of economic conditions, becomes so onerous for
towing companies that they might be forced to abandon competition with foreign towing companies, would it be reasonable, on the sole ground of violation of an abstract principle
formulated in former years by the Convention of Mannheim,
to reproach the Government of an independent country for
fixing such high prices? Present day economic conditions, to
take another example, frequently require persons engaged in
various industries and occupations to register with or become
members of a recognized body, failing which they will not be
allowed to work in those industries or occupations. Would it
not seem odd if, supposing that such a requirement were imposed upon shippers or shipowners in general those navigating on the River Rhine would be exempt solely because the
Mannheim Convention of 1868 recognizes the principle that
'la navigation du Rhin sera libre; il ne sera apporte aucun
obstacle, quel qu'il soit, a la libre navigation,' although this
principle has nothing whatsoever to do with the control of
industry?" 19
In 1934 the World Court had to deal with the impact of the
change in economic setting on navigational freedom in the celebrated Chinn20 case, concerning the Congo River. The implication
of the Chinn decision is that the navigational freedom concept is
concerned essentially with physical freedom of navigation and not
with the economic environment in which that navigation takes
place. The case merits special comment.
19 Boon &: Chantiers Navals du Rupel v. State of the Netherlands, 1952 Int'! L. Rep.
149, 150-51. The particular Dutch law in question was later struck down by the Dutch
Supreme Court as in conflict with the navigable freedom provisions of the Mannheim
Convention. See note 21 infra. But the Supreme Court decision does not detract from
the language quoted above.
20 Oscar Chinn, Permanent Court of Int'! Justice No. 63, ser. A/B (1934).
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Chinn, a British subject, operated freight vessels on the Congo.
UNATRA, a Belgian company, was a competitor in which the
Belgian Government owned a controlling interest. Chinn complained that the Belgian Government was violating the navigational freedom provisions of the Congo Act of 1885, as revised by
the Treaty of St. Germain of 1919, by extending special privileges
to UNATRA and thus permitting it to drive its competitors from
the field. The court decided, by a vote of six to five, that the
measures in question did not violate the treaty, that the Belgian
Government was acting in a private capacity, as a stockholder of
UNATRA, and not governmentally, and that such action posed
only a threat of private competition to Chinn, of which he could
not complain. In so holding, the court was apparently impressed
by the argument that the Belgian action was a small part of a
larger plan, the purpose of which was not, primarily, to interfere
with river navigation, but rather to alleviate the Congo's economic crisis of 1931.
A lesson to be drawn from this decision is that the navigational
freedom concept as applied by the World Court gives protection
primarily to the physical freedom of movement of vessels and is
not directly concerned with the economic environment in which
such movement takes place.21 This approach tends, in a very real
way, to render the free navigation principle feckless. 22 Why did
21 The 1952 decision of the Netherlands Supreme Court in the Restraint at Lobith
case, Boon & Chantiers Navals du Rupel v. State of the Netherlands, 1952 Int'! L. Rep.
149, takes a slightly broader view of the legal effect of the navigational freedom concept
as it appears in the Mannheim Convention. In that case, Boon, a Netherlands subject,
and Chantiers Navals du Rupel, of Belgium, sued the Netherlands Government for
damages for stopping plaintiff's vessels at the Dutch-German border. The vessels were
stopped because plaintiffs could not produce certificates from either of two Dutch organizations, membership in which and compliance with the regulations of which were, by
Dutch law, made a condition to navigation on the Rhine. The purpose of the regulations was to make a fair apportionment of freight among vessel operators. The Dutch
Supreme Court held for the plaintiffs, saying that the Dutch law was invalid because
in conflict with the navigable freedom provisions of the Mannheim Convention. It said
at 154:
"In the present case, however, the regulations were exclusively concerned with international inland navigation, and as appears from the names of the prescribed organizations, with international Rhine traffic more espedally; they do not only influence traffic
conditions indirectly, they affect navigation directly. Even if the regulations concerned
were indispensable for the Netherlands economy, they could still not be legally enacted
as long as the Convention of Mannheim remains in force unaltered." (Emphasis added.)
In view of the emphasized comments of the court it seems fair to assume that the
decision does not proscribe Dutch legislation of a general character which might have
an indirect or incidental effect on Rhine navigation. It speaks only to the question of
regulations "exclusively concerned with international inland navigation" on the Rhine.
22 Dr. Schwarzenberger, in 1 INTERNATIONAL LAw 236 (3d ed. 1957) comments on this
aspect of the Chinn decision and criticizes the court for suffering "from a too static view
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the court so hold? It is impossible to know precisely, but one may
observe that the decision is consistent with the fact that (I) national
economic planning is now a commonplace and expected activity
of the modern state government, and (2) a court of law would find
it practically impossible effectively to limit such economic planning on the basis of the very generalized navigational freedom provisions of the 1885 and 1919 treaties.
Thus, the effect of the Chinn case is to give an aura of legality
to a host of governmental economic planning maneuvers which
also have an incidental, but significant effect on international
river navigation. Such maneuvers include exchange controls, quota
restrictions, tariff barriers, regulation,23 subsidization, ownership,
or control of internal transport which connects or competes with
international river transport, and regulation, subsidization, ownership, or control of international transport where such action is
part of a plan to solve a general economic problem and is not
aimed directly at the control of navigation on a particular international waterway. 24

Navigational Freedom in Eastern Europe
So far we have been looking at the changes brought about in
the navigational freedom concept in western Europe, where the
idea originated. If we glance for a moment at eastern Europe it
becomes even more apparent that this concept has no relevance
to what occurs on international rivers there. As noted above,
navigational freedom was a product of the laissez faire, free trade
system of the nineteenth century. It was a natural outgrowth of
that system and was integrally wedded to it. The principle simply
has no relevance in a totally government-planned society. This
does not mean that the words "navigational freedom" are no
longer used in eastern Europe, or in the war of words between
East and West. For example, at the Belgrade Conference of 1948,
establishing the current Danube regime, the western delegates
pressed vigorously for a convention articulating the navigational
of the phenomenon of competition. While [the court's decision] was fully in accord with
the tenets of liberal economic theory, it was sadly out of touch with the realities of
economic life."
23 For example, in a 1948 Swiss case it was held that a Swiss law requiring accident
insurance for the crew of vessels operating on the Rhine did not violate the navigational
freedom provisions of the Mannheim Convention. Basler Rheinschiffahrt-Aktiengesellschaft v. Bundesamt Fiir Sozialversicherung, Switzerland, Federal Tribunal, 1948 Int'I
L. Rep. 69.
24. See Restraint at Lobith case, note 21 supra.
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freedom concept, presumably realizing that it could not possibly
become a reality in the six economically-planned downstream
riparian countries. The Communist majority, presumably with
the same realization, somewhat surprisingly agreed to such a convention, evidently believing it would improve its international
image to do so. Article I provides:
"Navigation on the Danube shall be free and open for the
nationals, vessels of commerce and goods of all states, on a
footing of equality in regard to port and navigation charges
and conditions of merchant shipping. The foregoing shall not
apply to traffic between ports of the same state."
In this respect we may note that a few West German and Austrian
vessels do today navigate the whole length of the Danube, and a
few vessels from other non-Communist nations operate on the
maritime Danube.25 It is possible that British, French, or United
States vessels might be allowed to pass along the river now. But
such physical freedom of movement is not the same "freedom of
navigation" intended in the various treaties, conventions and
writings on the subject in western Europe over the past 150 years.
Those documents and writings envisaged a laissez faire economic
system in which not only navigation took place, but loading facilities would be available upon the payment of a standard fee, and
cargoes could be obtained through the proffer of the right price
and service. Under the Communist governments of eastern Europe
the locus of decision-making regarding access to loading facilities
and cargoes is now changed. It is not held by the owner of the
private facility or business, interested primarily in making a private profit, but rather is held by government and other officials who
operate under the guidance of Communist political and economic
theory, and whose objectives and methods are, needless to say,
quite different.
Transport

In addition to changes in the over-all economic and political
setting in which navigation occurs today, there are other differences
that affect the navigational freedom picture. Especially important
are those that have occurred in the transport industry.
25 See COMMISSION DU DANUBE, BULLETIN STATISI'IQUE DE LA COMMISSION DU DANUBE

(1959, 1960). For a report on current shipping and navigational control on the Danube,
see Johnson, supra note 8, at 236.
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During the past fifty years profound changes in the efficiency
and organization of both national and international transport
have occurred. The transport industry as a whole has expanded
rapidly, has become highly complicated and interdependent, and
has become increasingly important to today's highly industrialized
societies.
International rivers of nineteenth century Europe held a
larger position in the over-all transport picture than they do today.
Roads were adequate only for limited transport; in many areas
they were poor in the rainy winter months. Railroads were still
in a developmental stage. It is true that the need for transport of
any kind was less than now, but that need was necessarily satisfied
to a greater extent by river travel. In the past fifty years we have
seen a vast expansion of rail and road transport, the birth and
development of air transport, and now rapid expansion of an
international pipeline system. River transport still plays an important part in the carriage of heavy, bulk items, such as iron ore,
coal, oil, and grain. But its relative importance has diminished.
Even more significant, it is now merely one part of a highly complicated and interdependent transport pattern. With these changes
it has become increasingly difficult to accord international rivers
a special legal regime.
A greater degree of governmental regulation and control has
come about in transport than has been true with most other
modern industries. Thus the general pattern in Europe today is
one of either outright state ownership, or else close regulation of
both rail and inland waterway transport. 26 This has affected navigation on international rivers in two ways. First, it has given
national governments a broader array of tools to influence and
control international river transport. Many "international" cargo
shipments either start or end their trips on intrastate carriers. In
other cases intrastate carriers are the principal competitors of the
international waterway carriers (e.g., railroads paralleling the
Rhine). By raising or lowering cargo rates of these connecting or
competitive carriers, or by subsidizing or controlling their operation in other ways a national government can exert a compelling
influence on the international carrier.27 Second, the existence,
26 See DIEBOLD, THE SHUMAN PLAN 178 (1959).

27 See MANCE, INTERNATIONAL RIVER AND CANAL TRANSPORT 38 (1944), for a discussion
of how international traffic on the Rhine has been adversely affected by national policies
showing favoritism toward railroads.
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over a period of years, of government ownership, regulation and
control of intrastate transport systems has conditioned business
and public opinion to an acceptance of similar controls over international transport, the kind of regulation now being brought about
by the European Communities.
Another area of change having an impact on navigational
freedom concerns the fact that navigation no longer holds such a
dominant place in the use of Europe's, or the world's, great rivers.28
It is not unusual today to find a single river in demand for naviga•
tion, municipal water supply, sewage and industrial waste aisposal, power generation, irrigation, fish propagation, and recrea•
tion. Most of these uses have either originated or assumed greater
importance within the past half century. It is therefore not sur•
prising that the more casual, laissez faire approach of many states
toward the control of their rivers in the nineteenth century has
given way to an increasingly apparent "management" approach
in contemporary times. This trend toward closer management has
been encouraged because governments at one level or another,
rather than private enterprise, have historically carried much of
the responsibility for sewage disposal, domestic water supply, wildlife conservation, and public recreational facilities.
In this connection, it is appropriate to note the distinction between international rivers and the open seas. The freedom of the
seas concept arose largely because of the exceptional difficulties of
asserting control over the seas for more than a few miles offshore,
and from the fact that the difficulty and cost of asserting more
extensive claims was not warranted by the somewhat less vital interests to be protected thereby. (These interests are now increasing
rapidly in number and importance.) On the other hand, it is
relatively easy for a nation to control rivers that run through or
along its borders, and states historically have done so. And there
are now many vital, national interests that states have in such
rivers, which tend to encourage close regulation, and which do not
exist, or are only beginning to exist, in the case of the high seas.
Another geographical distinction should be made, i.e., between
those parts of international rivers that are usable for ocean-going
vessels and those that are usable only for river craft. The argument
for extending the freedom of the seas notion to the "ocean-going"
part of the river is a good deal easier to make than that for the
28

See

BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL

I.Aw 390 (2d ed. 1962).
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"river craft" sector.29 Ocean-going vessels have a freedom of movement that is not shared by river craft. When competition becomes
too keen in one area they can usually be moved to another part of
the world. River craft, on the other hand, are usually captives of
a single river, or river system, and may even be limited by their
draft, or engine capacity, to a portion of a river. Seldom can they
operate from one river to another or onto the ocean. This geographical restriction reduces their competitive opportunities and
puts added pressure on the state whose flag they fly to protect them
through discriminatory regulations, subsidies and the like. If, as
is usually the case, this state is a riparian, the understandable result is a tendency to restrict the freedom of foreign vessels.
Another factor that differentiates nineteenth century navigational control problems from those of our time is the extensive
canalization now being carried out in Europe. The Moselle canalization will be completed in a few years, connecting the French steel
industry directly with the Rhine. Work on the Rhine-Main-Danube canal is well along. There are definite plans to complete the
Danube-Oder canals. Numerous other, less spectacular canals have
been completed or are under construction.
Such canalization increases the difficulty of guaranteeing navigational freedom on international rivers. Canals are traditionally
subject to national control-in spite of the fact that they may be
physically linked to a "free" international waterway. National
governments thus have an additional lever for controlling international waterways. For example, the national government can,
on its canals, impose regulations favoring its own shipping in such
a way as effectively to bar or harass foreign shipping. Such action
would tend to inhibit the "freedom" of such foreign vessels even
on the international waterway.
,
At the Barcelona Conference of 1921 this problem was recognized, and an attempt was made to put canals and the international
rivers with which they connect on the same legal footing, i.e., both
29 See, e.g., CHAMBERLAIN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 281-82. "The problem of freedom
of navigation to all flags of international rivers may be divided into two clearly marked
parts, freedom for seagoing ships to sail up to the river ports where they transfer to
and from river boats, and strictly fluvial navigation. So far as the first is concerned,
the river should, for this purpose, be treated as an arm of the sea, for the second, the
fluvial community should have full power of disposition. The distinction between rivers
and the open sea should be kept in view. The open sea is a roadway between. practically
all countries, which all are interested in keeping open because their trade passes over it.
A river is a pathway of trade only to the states bordering it and can be of interest only
to them and the countries with which they traffic."
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subject to rules of navigational freedom. The attempt did not
succeed, and canals, along with internal rivers, have continued to
be subject to exclusive national control.

New Developments: The European Coal and Steel Community
and the European Economic Community
So long as Europe consisted of sovereign, independent states,
it was unlikely that a unified system of regulatory controls could
be established for international river transport. The same forces
which tended to foster state sovereignty worked to retard the
development of such international controls. However, with the
development of the common markets the sovereignty theme in
Europe has been replaced by that of unity. As an incidental consequence of this change, the Rhine is gradually losing its character
as an international river and taking on the aspect of an internal
body of water within the newly emerging European federal state.
Precisely what this will mean for "navigational freedom" cannot
now be ascertained, but there is some evidence available. In general, this evidence points to a system of greater regulation. As
indicated below, the increased regulation will apply to the whole
of the transport industry, but especially to rail and inland waterway transport, and will cover international as well as intrastate
movements.
An examination of the various publications of the European
Economic Community indicates that the transport question is
being attacked as part of the over-all problem of coordinating and
encouraging Europe's economic growth. Needless to say, transport
can make or break industrial development. It is essential to the
Community's continued success that the transport industry be
made as efficient as possible. To meet this objective the Community is planning a comprehensive regulatory program. It is
true that this may mean increased competition among the industries dependent on transport, but for the transport industry itself
there will likely be less competition, less freedom, and more regulation. Of course, in the rail and inland water industry this will
mean merely a change in emphasis from national regulation to one
of supranational regulation, a change from working with uncoordinated and diverse national policies to working with a single
(hopefully) coordinated and harmonious international policy.
Before the birth of the European Coal and Steel Community
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(ECSC) in 1952 there were three major unfavorable aspects in the
European coal and steel economy that were attributed to transport:
"[T]he practice by which some countries forced foreign producers to pay more for the carriage of goods than home
producers and consumers-'discrimination';
"[T]he growth over a period of many years of divergent transport policies in each country;
"[T]he fact that crossing a frontier automatically raised the
price of freight above the rates already charged within a
country [load breaking]." 80
The High Authority of the ECSC attacked all three of these
problems on the ground that their elimination would facilitate
the free flow of goods and thus encourage competition in the
various industries of the Community. Within the first few years
of the treaty it was able to eliminate more than thirty cases of
"discrimination," and this aspect of the work has now been completed. The problem of "load breaking" has similarly been
solved. But the problem of harmonization of divergent transport
policies has not been solved, and is proving difficult. In addition
there have been recurrent crises on the Rhine, brought on by the
cyclical effect of unregulated competition.
Various solutions to these problems have been tried. In the
early 1950's it was suggested that the Rhine system be brought
under regulatory control somewhat like that used internally in
the European states. This idea was not well received and was
shelved.31 It is doubtful, in any event, whether the ECSC had
sufficient power under the treaty to carry it out, inasmuch as it
can act only with regard to coal and steel. The transport problem
as such is not within its jurisdiction, except as it relates to these
items, yet any regulation of transport with regard to coal and
steel would necessarily affect transport of other commodities.
Other attempts were made to alleviate the more serious problems. With regard to cargo haulage rates, several unsuccessful
efforts were made to require international rates to conform to
national rates. Failing these, in July 1957, the Community members signed the "Rhine Agreement," 82 providing that domestic
30 P.E.P., EURol'EAN ORGANIZATIONS 256 (1959). See also 7 EuROl'EAN YB. 47 (1961).
31 See DIEBOLD, op. cit. supra note 26, at 179.
32 Agreement on Rhine River Navigation, concluded between the member governments in July 1957, effective May 1, 1958. Article 2 provides: "With a view to eliminating the, at times, very considerable disparities in transport rates, the member states

482

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

rates should be adjusted to international rates, which were to be
left free for determination between shipping companies and their
customers. This unlikely plan has apparently been disregarded
by member states.88
With the advent of the European Economic Community a
broader approach was taken. The Commission of the EEC determined that under articles 3, 74, and 75 of the Rome Treaty it was
required to establish a common policy in the transport field. Toward the accomplishment of this objective it published a major
memorandum in May 1961 outlining such a policy.84 This memorandum outlines various "special aspects" of the existing transport
systems which pose special problems, such as "(a) the intervention
of the public authorities in infrastructure matters, (b) certain
peculiarities in the structure of supply and demand in the transport sector, (c) the obligations incumbent on a public service,
and. (d) the enforced reduction of charges.'' 85 The memorandum
then comments on possible Community action to alleviate problems raised by these "special aspects":
"The chief means to this end are the equitable distribution
of infrastructure costs among the budgets concerned, improved
administration and operational organization, the placing of
certain limits on transport capacity and the imposition of
some restriction on freedom to fix transport rates. To these
should be added an easing of the obligations as a public service, action to offset those obligations which remain and fair
, compensation for loss of revenue due to reduction in the
rates charged."86
With regard to tariff rates for the haulage of cargoes the memorandum suggests the establishment of a system of price brackets,
with checks in the form of publication of rates. Carriers will then
be required to operate within these price brackets, leaving them
a "certain liberty ... chosen in such a way as to avoid excessive
3:pplying their administrative regulations to Rhine traffic rates on the national level
undertake to keep these regulated internal rates constantly in line with the level of
the representative rates freely instituted by the shipping companies." See P.E.P., op.
cit. supra note 30, at 259.

ss See E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTIIORITY, EIGHTH

AND NINTH GENERAL REPORTS ON THE AcnvOF 'fHE COMMUNITY (covering the period from February 1, 1959 to January 31, 1961).
84 E.E.C. COMMISSION, FOURTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcnvrrIES OF THE COMMUNITY,
MAY 16, 1960 TO APRIL 30, 1961, 139-52 (1961).
35 Id. at 140.· ,

lTJES

86
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competition or monopoly."87 For inland waterway transport in
particular, the memorandum suggests that measures must be taken
to lessen certain difficulties, such as the excessive number of small
enterprises, and inadequate training for the work.
It is not difficult to see that the direction the Community
proposes to take with regard to transport is toward more regulation, and toward the limiting of competition. As applied to international river navigation, this would seem to portend a further
modification of the "navigational freedom" principle.

Conclusion
What, then, is the future of the venerated principle of freedom
of navigation? Certainly its continued repetition as a kind of
platitude or talisman will spread joy only among cliche buffs, but
will accomplish little toward solving the real problems of commerce and navigation on the world's international rivers. To this
author it would seem that the principle, or at least its nineteenth
century version, probably ought to be stored away as the interesting historical notion that it is. It is festooned with too many
meanings, and carries with it a too "dated" political and economic
background to be useful now. Rather, it would seem that a
fresh approach to the control of international rivers should be
developed, one that takes into account the contemporary and still
changing interests of the countries that use and benefit from the
use of these rivers. An effort should be made to locate and accurately to describe these interests, determining their present value
to society as well as anticipating their future worth. A number of
questions ought to be asked, and answered, such as: What are the
actual uses, e.g., navigation, fish propagation, sewage disposal,
power generation, irrigation, and recreation, that are now being
made of the world's international rivers? What are the relative
economic, social, and political values of these uses to contemporary
society? What will be or should be their worth in the future? By
whom, and for whose benefit-riparians, nonriparians, or bothare these rivers to be controlled? These are only suggestive of the
questions that should be thought out and answered before a new
effort at generalization is attempted. In particular, if the free
navigation idea is to be further used, we should know more
accurately what its advocates mean by it, and what its acceptance
87

Id. at 147.
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and application would mean in contemporary society. Then, and
only then, will we be able to assess its utility within our own
value structure.
To this author it seems likely that further study of the problem will not only confirm the irrelevance of the navigational
freedom notion, but will also indicate the impracticability of
creating any substitute generalization to take its place. The day
is past when navigation plays such a dominant role, vis-a-vis other
uses, on the world's international rivers. The particular concatenation of demands on each river is now so unique as to suggest
an individual treatment for each one, giving due regard to the
many and diverse community needs that must be served by it.

